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Introduction 
This paper attempts to assess the viability of the regional security arrangements in the Middle East from the 
broader perspective of the interplay between the mega trends of globalization, regionalization, and democratization. 
These trends will be examined in general and in the context of the Middle East in particular in order to understand 
the extent to which they have influenced and were influenced by the security arrangements in that region. By 
reviewing the competing security arrangements in the Middle East and analyzing their experience in dealing with 
the security challengers, we will infer the common factors, which lead to successful regional cooperation. The 
choice of the Middle East is justified by the fact that this region is one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the 
world. In fact the region was described as characterized by the dominance of the Hobbesian state of nature. Various 
security arrangements were devised and were met with varying degrees of success. By drawing upon the experience 
of the Middle East, one could reach certain policy recommendations concerning the factors that lead to the success 
or failure of security arrangements. The Middle East is understood here as the wider area that includes the Eastern 
Mediterranean, West Asia, and North Africa. 
 
The paper will be divided into ten parts. It will begin by conceptualizing the interplay between the mega trends at 
the global level during and after the Cold War with a view of delineating its impact on the conceptualization of 
security. In the second part, such interplay will be examined with reference to the case of the various security 
arrangements that were put forward during and after the Cold War in the Middle East. The four following parts will 
deal with the three main security arrangements that were proposed in the Middle East, the major regional dialogue 
operating in the region, that is, the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue. These arrangements and dialogue will then be 
compared with a view of drawing certain policy stances on the factors that lead to the success of security 
arrangements. The eighth part will deal with the future of the security arrangements in the Middle East after 
September 11, 2001 and the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq in April 2003. The ninth part will review the recent 
developments in the area of security arrangements of the region, namely the trend of the internationalization of such 
security arrangements whereby the region will be put under the scrutiny of great powers. Finally, the paper will 
attempt to draw conclusions concerning the conditions conducive to successful regional cooperation especially in 
the field of security, and identifying policy recommendations to make for future practice.  
I Major Shifts in the Interplay between the Mega Trends and their Implications for Security 
The East-West Cold War dominated international politics for almost a half century. Although it did not result in a 
military global confrontation, it generated numerous regional, inter-state and civil wars, and in the dumping of 
tremendous resources in global and regional arms races. Under the Cold War conditions, a new pattern of global 
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relations emerged which came to be characterized as interdependence. This new phenomenon was facilitated mainly 
by the revolutions of technology and mass communications. It entailed a tremendous increase in world trade, and a 
higher level of sensitivity of actors to developments within each other, and more or less equal vulnerability to the 
same external variables. However, the state remained the main unit of analysis and the emphasis was on inward-
oriented development strategies. Further, during the Cold War, regional projects for cooperation were subordinated 
to global bipolar competitions. Most of the regional governmental enterprises were reflections to the Cold War 
struggles. One may recall that the West European regional project which was formalized in 1957 was mainly an 
attempt to strengthen Western Europe against perceived Soviet threats, and to reverse the marginalization of 
Europe’s role in international politics. The criteria of geographical contiguity, and legal institutionalism were 
considered the cornerstones of the concept of regionalism. Most regional problems were extensions of the bipolar 
struggles and were mainly approached from this perspective.  
The issue of the type of political regime (democratic vs. authoritarian) was hardly an international issue during 
the Cold War. Despite the ideological struggle between the two models of political and economic development 
advocated by the East and the West, the superpowers rarely considered the type of political regime in the Third 
World countries an issue in their global struggle to win friends or alienate enemies. Granted that the Soviet Union 
established socialist-authoritarian systems in East Europe and the other countries it dominated, and the USA 
managed to establish liberal democracies in the countries it occupied, namely Japan and Germany, but they rarely 
approached developing countries from that angle. The struggle was mainly focused on winning friends regardless of 
the political regime. Both superpowers supported authoritarian regimes provided that these were loyal to them. One 
can only examine the cases of the American-sponsored military coup against the democratically elected President of 
Chile, Salvador Allende in 1973, the American-South Vietnamese link until 1974 or the American South Korean 
relationship until 1993 and the Soviet relationship with regimes of different political ideologies such as Nasser’s 
Egypt and Nehru’s India, to conclude that democracy was hardly an issue during these days.  
As the Cold war was approaching its end, a qualitative shift began to emerge in the global pattern of 
interdependence, paving the way for the emergence of globalization. Globalization meant the integration of world 
economy into a single main pattern, the transcendence of the state into a new pattern of supra-territoriality and the 
standardization of the global criterion for economic, cultural, and political cooperation.  
The end of the Cold War and the bipolar struggle, and the emergence of globalization loosed the subordination of 
regional issues to global ones. It became possible to address regional issues on their own terms and to approach 
regional institution building from a more flexible perspective. The end of the Cold War also raised a different set of 
issues in regional cooperation; the most important of which was the issue of trade liberalization, which became the 
cornerstone of neo-regional cooperation project.  
Other structural forces contributed to the rise of the regionalist perspective. Among these forces one may refer to 
the shift towards outward-oriented strategies of development in the developing world. Cognizant of the success of 
the outward-oriented strategies of East Asian nations during the Cold War, developing countries began to shift away 
from their protectionist strategies towards gaining more access for their own exports in Western markets. This led to 
greater willingness to negotiate regional deals with the main trading partners. The growing importance of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) to trade also increased the attractiveness of regional agreements between states, where greater 
cultural and interest affinities can facilitate agreements on NTBs.  
These dramatic changes resulted in the rise of a new pattern of regionalism. There has been a dramatic increase in 
intra-regional trade and investment, especially in North America, the European Union, and East Asia. The new 
emphasis on regionalism entailed four main concepts which taken together form the essence of a new paradigm of 
regionalism.  
First, geographical proximity is no longer the main determinant of regional cooperation. It is now possible for 
geographically disparate countries to belong to the same regional grouping on the basis on shared interests. Second, 
regional institutions are mainly oriented towards socio-economic issues rather than politico-strategic ones. As a 
corollary, ideology is no longer considered an essential bond for forming the new regional groupings. Third, 
emphasis on loose institutionalism rather than legal-organizational approaches, or in other words, emphasis on 
integration without institutionalization. The criteria of building regional groupings around a charter and permanent 
secretariat are no longer considered viable means for regional cooperation. Instead, there is a new emphasis on the 
formation of a functional system, which consists of broad guidelines of action and simple institutions with no 
permanent elaborate bureaucratic structures. Fourth: Neo-regional cooperation centered on the theme of trade 
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liberalization and integration into the main rules laid down by the Uruguay Round in 1994 and the World Trade 
Organization later on. The objective is no longer to achieve self-reliance or collective self-reliance, as was the case 
during the Cold War, but rather to unleash the market forces domestically and regionally.  
The establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) reflected this neo-regionalist 
paradigm. This institution consists of set geographically non-contiguous countries, ideologically different, but 
committed to the objective of trade liberalization. One needs only to recall that the three Chinese economies are all 
members of the APEC to comprehend its neo-regionalist dimensions. The establishment of other groupings such as 
the Indian Ocean Rim Community (IORC) in 1997 is another instance in the same direction (Selim, 1999).  
Finally, new forms of regional interaction were introduced such as regional dialogues. Processes of regional 
dialogues are based on informal exchanges of views, the creation of an intra-regional policy networks and unilateral 
measures (Dieter, 1998). The ASEAN Regional Forum and the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue are prime examples 
of this form of neo-regionalism. 
The end of the Cold War also unleashed the issue of the type of political regime as a global issue. This was 
mainly facilitated by the collapse of the authoritarian regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which led to 
the rise of the notion of the End of History. The anti-authoritarian revolutions and changes in the former communist 
bloc triggered waves of democratization across the world. Neo-Liberal theorists argued that democratization was 
essential to maintain global peace, as democracies do not fight each other. However, progress on the road to 
democratization was much slower than progress toward regionalization.i  
These radical developments influenced the conceptualization of security. During the Cold War, a realist concept 
of security prevailed whereby the concept was state-centric and dominated by issues related to military force and 
diplomacy. Various regional collective security institutions were established all of which virtually focused on 
strategies of deterrence, containment, and armament. States dominated the discourse on national, regional and 
international security; three levels which were almost separate. The advent of the age of globalization led to a new 
discourse on security characterized by the “de-statecentrisation” of the concept of security, in addition to presenting 
a new human-centric perspective. Security arrangements have become to be based upon broader concepts of 
economic, political, and cultural interactions rather than purely militaristic ones and on notions of dealing with 
“new” security threats (environmental decay, spread of new epidemics, etc) parallel with traditional ones (Brandao, 
1998, Reed and Tehranian, 1999).  
II The Interplay between the Mega Trends in the Middle East during and after the Cold War 
The Middle East is an exemplary arena for the interplay between the forces of globalization, regionalization, and 
democratization. Since the advent of the imperialist age to the Middle East in the nineteenth century, the region has 
been well connected with the global system and highly influenced by its transformations. The global-Middle Eastern 
connection was characterized by the dependence of the Middle East on the global system. Such pattern of dependent 
relationship continued after the “political independence” of Middle Eastern states. During the Cold War, the patterns 
of development, and trade were characterized by their emphases on Westernism. Further, two main regional projects 
emerged in the Middle East: Arab regional and Middle Eastern. Each project implied a different set of assumptions, 
concepts, and security arrangements, and both competed for dominance in the Middle East during the Cold War, and 
the end of that War revived that competition. The Middle Eastern project, mainly advocated by Western powers, 
viewed the Middle East as a geographical area, rich in oil resources, containing a mosaic of nations, and threatened 
by external hostile powers mainly the Soviet Union. The region, it was argued, should be linked with the West 
through a security regime and a set of economic arrangements, which would stabilize the region and preserve 
Western interests. The United States first enunciated the Project in 1950 when it suggested to establish a Middle 
East Defense Organization (MEDO) and President Eisenhower re-introduced the idea in 1953 when he proposed to 
establish an alliance between the northern tier countries of the Middle East to contain the Soviet Union (Mustafa, 
1987, Al-Kilany, 2000) The countries meant were Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq. In response to this proposal, Iraq 
and Turkey singed a security pact in February,1955 according to which the two countries pledged to defend each 
other in case of a foreign aggression. Britain joined the pact in April,1955 and it became to be known as the 
Baghdad Pact. The Pact was met with vehement opposition from the advocates of the Arab regional project. Such 
criticism was quite instrumental in preventing Jordan from joining it. After the 1958 Iraqi revolution, Iraq withdrew 
from the Baghdad Pact and the headquarters of the Pact was moved to Ankara. The Pact came to be known as the 
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Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The last time the idea was introduced during the Cold War was when 
President Reagan introduced the concept of “Strategic Consensus” among Middle Eastern countries in 1982 under 
the auspices of the USA. This was done in the wake of the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Iranian 
revolution, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the collapse of the CENTO, all of which occurred in the 
same year, 1979. Strategic consensus meant that Middle Eastern countries would establish and overall understanding 
that the Soviet Union was the major threat to the region, and would resolve their conflicts in a way that would 
ultimately lead to a strategic relationship with the USA. If countries of the region failed to resolve their disputes, 
they would solicit American help.  
Advocates of the Arab regional project, mainly Arab nationalists, contended that the Middle Eastern project was 
a Western invention. They argue that the region to which they belong was characterized by the dominance of one 
Arab nation that has common features, interests, and security concerns and priorities. The Arab peoples enjoy the 
unity of language, culture, and geography, which entitle them to form their own security and economic 
arrangements. The main threat to the security of the region was perceived to be Israel. 
Arab regional arrangements should be established in order to minimize that threat. These arrangements should be 
placed within an Arab security framework. The main embodiment of that project was the establishment of the 
League of Arab States in 1945 and the signing of the Arab Common Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty in 
1950. 
The two projects competed for dominance in the Middle East during the 1950s and 1960s. The 1967 Arab defeat 
dealt a serious blow to the Arab regional project, as the weakness of the forces of Arab nationalism and radicalism 
was exposed. The Arab regional project was weakened even further, with the death of Nasser in 1970, the main 
champion of this project, the advent to power in Egypt of a new leadership that emphasizes upon Egyptianism, and 
the subsequent developments such as the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace Treaty in 1979 (which detached 
Egypt from Arab security arrangements against Israel), the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988), and the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990. That invasion resulted in a major rupture in the Arab regional project, which is still imprinted on it.  
The Middle Eastern and Arab projects failed to develop any significant security arrangements to the region. The 
Baghdad Pact was weakened after the 1958 Iraqi revolution and its successor the CENTO, and was dissolved in 
1979. On two occasions the Arab regional project was able to initiate some security arrangements. These were 
during the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis in 1961 and the Arab plans to prevent Israel from diverting the water of the Jordan 
River in 1964-1967. After the independence of Kuwait in 1961. Qasim the then President of Iraq claimed that 
Kuwait was a part of Iraq and asserted his intention to annex it. Britain sent troops to Kuwait to safeguard against a 
possible Iraqi invasion. The League of Arab States formed a joint Arab emergency forces that landed in Kuwait and 
replaced the British forces. The plan succeeded in protecting the newly independent Gulf State. Once again in 1964, 
Egypt called for the convening of an Arab summit in Cairo to draw plans to prevent Israel from diverting the Jordan 
River to its territory. The summit established an Arab joint military command headed by an Egyptian General to 
draft plans to protect Arab projects in the Jordan River. The Command did not succeed in protecting these projects 
during the 1967 War, and was later on disbanded. During that era various bilateral security arrangements between 
Arab states were formed, such as the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi security arrangements in 1955, the Egyptian- Syrian 
mutual defense pact in 1966, the Egyptian-Libyan-Sudanese security arrangements in 1971, and finally the 
Egyptian-Syrian security arrangements which enabled them to launch war against Israel in 1973. Perhaps, with the 
exception of the last arrangement, most Arab security arrangements were not effective. They reflected the short-term 
interests of Arab states and lacked a long-term vision for security in the Arab regional System. Further, sub-regional 
security arrangements were developed on the periphery of the Middle East between Arab partners to make up for the 
limited performance of the Arab regional project. The most important of these was the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) in 1981 and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 1984. The GCC consisted on Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and the AMU included Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. Whereas the GCC entailed a specific, but limited, security structure in the form of Al-Jazeera Shield Force, 
the AMU was essentially an economic arrangement.  
The Middle Eastern dependent relationship with the global system and the rivalry between the two regional 
projects over dominance in the region helped to marginalize the issue of democracy in the Middle East. In this 
respect, the Middle East was no exception from the global pattern. Further, the region was ridden with so many 
conflicts, which rendered the issue of democracy a low priority one. The most important t of these was the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the inter-Arab cold wars between Arab revolutionaries and conservatives, the regional struggle 
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between the Arab and Middle Eastern projects, and most importantly the global Cold war struggle, which dominated 
the Middle East. 
After the end of the Cold War, the struggle between the Middle Eastern and Arab projects was revived. This was 
a result of the major blow to the Arab regional project suffered as a result if the Second Gulf crisis of 19901991. 
Non Arab Middle Eastern countries (Iran, Israel, and Turkey) emerged as net winners after this crisis at the expense 
of the Arabs. The struggle was soon joined by a third regional project, an Euro-Mediterranean one supported by the 
European Union (EU). Each of the three projects had certain assumptions and proposals concerning the future 
security arrangements in the Middle East. In the following sections these projects will be reviewed and compared. 
The comparison of these projects will be based on the following criteria: (I) The security conceptualization of each 
project and its relationship with the other dimensions of regional cooperation, (ii) the strategies advocated to achieve 
security, (iii) the level of consensus with each project on the main conceptualizations of security, (iv) the 
relationship of each regional security arrangement with the United Nations and major powers; and (v) the 
institutional capacity of the project in the area of collective security, and peaceful resolution of disputes among 
member states.  
III Security Arrangements within the Middle Eastern Project 
The Middle Eastern project was revived in the wake of the convening of the Madrid Arab-Israeli peace 
conference in October 1991. The Madrid conference was branched off into two main tracks, namely, a bilateral track 
and a multi-lateral one. The bilateral track focused upon the negotiations to reach a political settlement of the 
territorial issues on a bilateral basis between Israel and each of the neighboring countries whose territories are 
occupied. The second dealt with future economic and security arrangements. In this respect five working groups 
were formed, namely: Arms Control and Regional Security, Regional Economic Cooperation, Refugees, Water, and 
Environment. Many non-Middle Eastern countries took part in the multi-lateral tracks. In fact, the working groups 
were chaired by big powers and their meetings were held in different places in and outside the Middle East, in order 
to emphasize the “internationalization” of the multi-lateral track. The Syrians and the Lebanese boycotted this track 
arguing that they cannot discuss regional cooperation projects in which Israel will be a partner unless a political 
settlement has been reached within the bilateral track. However, Egypt participated in the five working groups 
arguing that the multi-lateral negotiators should go parallel with the bilateral ones.  
The main security issues were discussed in the working group on arms control and regional security. Two major 
approaches emerged in this group concerning the future security agreements, Egyptian and Israeli. The main issues 
were related to the relationship between the arms control regime and the political settlement, the mechanisms of 
arms control, and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East. The Egyptians argued that 
establishing an arms control regime should precede or at least go parallel with the political settlement between the 
Arab and the Israelis. Such regime cannot be postponed until the completion of the peace process. Israel contended 
that no genuine arms control could be reached until the parameters of the political situation and the elements of the 
political agreements on the territorial issues have been reached. Israel also argued that an arms control regime 
should begin by introducing certain confidence-building measures, such as the conduct of joint military exercises 
and joint border patrols, the ban on the exportation of weapons to the Middle East, and finally the elimination of the 
chemical and biological weapons from the region. Israel advocated establishing a regional arms control regime 
rather than subscribing to the global ones.  
The Egyptians contended that these proposals would establish a Middle East dominated by Israel. A ban on the 
exportation of arms to the Middle East should be combined by restrictions on local manufacturing of arms, because 
Israel is the only Middle Eastern country that manufactures most of its arms. Further, all categories of weapons of 
mass destruction should be eliminated from the Middle East including the nuclear weapons possessed by Israel. 
Such removal must be immediate and simultaneous. Israel asserted it would not remove its nuclear arsenal until 
peace treaties were signed with Arab countries and Iran. The Egyptians also contended that the calculation of the 
military balance should take into consideration the capabilities of other powers in the region, such as Iran and 
Turkey, and, as such, should not purely calculated between Israel and all Arab countries only. It is important to 
notice here that Iran and Turkey have not participated in these debates as Iran was not invited and Turkey 
considered itself outside the arms control regime of the Middle East (Selim, 2000d). This has resulted in no 
significant progress in the question of establishing a regional security arrangement.  
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Issues related to economic security were discussed in the other four working groups. Once again, there was a 
disagreement over issues related to refugees, environment, water, and regional economic cooperation. For example, 
whereas the Arabs wanted to implement United Nations resolutions on the issue of the Palestinian refugees, the 
Israelis rejected their return and linked that issue to the question of the “Jewish refugees” from Arab countries. Also, 
Israel wanted to establish a pan regional regime of water distribution according to which it would share Arab rivers. 
The Egyptians contended that the resources of the Nile were not a matter of negotiation as the Nile River was 
controlled by agreements with the African riparian states. The Arabs and the Israelis also differed on the linkages 
between regional economic cooperation and the settlement of political issues with the Israelis advocating the 
precedence of the former, the Egyptians arguing that the two types of issues were inter-linked. The Syrians, who did 
not participate, adopted the position that regional economic cooperation was not likely to proceed in the absence of 
the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. 
One of the most important manifestations of the Middle Eastern projects was the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) series of conferences held to formulate a pan Middle Eastern regime for economic cooperation. The 
conferences were held in Casablanca (1994), Amman (1995), Cairo (1996), and Doha (1997). These conferences 
were convened after the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization in 1993 which provided for a framework to establish A Palestinian Authority in the Palestinian 
occupied territories and establishing a Palestinian state by 1998. Also, Simon Peres, the then Foreign Minister of 
Israel, issued a book in 1993 entitled The New Middle East, in which he envisioned a new regional cooperation 
system. Washington seized the opportunity to persuade the Swiss-based Davos Forum to call for the convening a 
regional economic cooperation conference for the Middle and North Africa. The Casablanca conference represented 
the second official launching of the concept of a Middle Eastern regional system. The conference issued the 
Casablanca Declaration, which reiterated that building the foundation of an economic group for the Middle East and 
North Africa required the flow of goods, capital and labor in the region including the establishment of a 
development bank. It also established a steering committee and an executive secretariat. It was also decided to hold 
the conference annually.  
The last of these conferences was held in Doha as most Arabs refused to proceed on this track after the election 
of the hard-line Netanyahu government in Israel in 1996. The new Israeli government was against the Declaration of 
Principles. It ordered the acceleration of the building of Israeli colonies in the occupied territories, and most 
importantly it gave the Middle Eastern project no priority in its agenda. It viewed that project as a legacy of the 
“soft-line” previous Rabin-Peres Government. This represented the end of the Middle East security arrangements at 
the level of the multi-lateral working groups and the MENA conferences. However, the idea of a Middle Eastern 
framework for security is still being debated as one of the potential arrangements for the future of the Middle East, 
especially after the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 as will be outlined later.  
IV Security Arrangements within the Euro-Mediterranean Project 
Of all the regional projects in the Middle East, the Euro-Mediterranean (EMP) is the most elaborate and multi-
dimensional. The EU introduced the concept of the EMP in 1994 to safeguard its interests in the Mediterranean in 
view of the security threats emanating from that region. The most important of these were the violent trends in North 
Africa, the influx of immigrants from North Africa to Europe, and the continuation of the Arab-Israeli deadlock. 
Also, the project was motivated by the marginalization of the EU’s role in MENA conferences. According to this 
concept, the member-states of the EU and twelve selected Mediterranean countries would enter into a series of 
“association agreements” between the EU and each Mediterranean country in order to create a free trade area by the 
year 2010, and security-political and social-cultural frameworks for cooperation.  
In 1994, the EU announced a Proposal directed to “support the establishing of a zone of stability and security and 
creating conditions for lasting and sustainable rapid economic development in the Mediterranean countries.” The 
Proposal reiterated two main dimensions of the Partnership, namely, (I) Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Zone of 
Stability and Security through political dialogue between the EU and the Mediterranean countries based on the 
principles of democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and the efforts of the EU to persuade Mediterranean 
countries to renounce non-conventional military options. A code of conduct among Mediterranean countries for the 
resolution of disputes was also suggested; and (ii) establishing an Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area in which all 
manufactured products would be traded freely. In October 1995, the EU issued another statement, which 
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operationalized the EMP proposal. The new policy statement outlined three main aspects of the EMP, a political and 
security aspect, an economic and financial aspect, and a social and human aspect. Upon the initiative of the EU, the 
first ministerial meeting of the 27 Euro-Mediterranean partners was held in Barcelona, which led to the labeling of 
the entire process as the Barcelona Process. The conference witnessed heated debates between the EU and the 
Mediterranean countries on the elements of the EMP. The final declaration (The Barcelona Declaration) reflected to 
a large extent the European viewpoint as far as the nature of security of the Mediterranean and the free trade area.  
The EMP activities consist of bilateral and multi-lateral tracks. The former are governed by Euro-Mediterranean 
Association agreements singed between the EU and each participating Mediterranean country. It is important to 
notice that although Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta are member states in the EMP they have not entered into 
negotiations to sign association agreements with the EU as their ambitions go beyond the EMP. They are in the 
EMP to camouflage the fact that the objective is to build an Arab-Israeli economic and security framework 
sponsored by the EU. In fact, Cyprus and Malta will join the EU in 2004. Turkey also hopes to follow. This will 
leave the EMP with only some Arab states and Israel, which will turn the entire process into a Middle Eastern one, 
with an EU participation. Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Authority signed separate association 
agreements with the EU. Only Syria has not signed yet.  
At the multi-lateral tracks, the EU and its Mediterranean partners have developed series of institutions, which 
hold annual conferences to monitor and develop the EMP. The most important of these are (I) the Euro-
Mediterranean conference that takes place at the level of foreign ministers, and meetings of sectoral ministers, 
government experts and representatives of civil society; and (ii) the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the 
Barcelona Process. The Committee meets on a quarterly basis at senior officials’ level and is chaired by the EU 
presidency. It consists of the EU Troika, Mediterranean partners, and the European commission representatives 
(member states not in the EU Troika also participate). The Committee acts as an overall steering body for the 
regional process with the right s to initiate activities to be financed by the EU programs.  
The EMP was not able to develop a viable security arrangement in the Mediterranean. This was mainly due to the 
contending approaches of the Europeans and the Israelis on one hand and the Arabs on the other hand concerning 
the architecture of security in the Mediterranean, which mainly refers to the Middle East, or to be specific to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The main issues of contention are, (I) strategies to be pursued to achieve security; and (ii) the 
role of the EU in building security architecture in the Mediterranean. Whereas the views of the EU are well 
articulated in its documents, such as the draft Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, and the Common 
EU Strategy in the Mediterranean adopted by the European Council in 2000, Arab viewpoints are not well-
articulated in specific documents and they can only be identified through the different statements of Arab policy 
makers. The EU advocated a confidence-building, strategy as the main security strategy in the Mediterranean. It 
argued that this strategy had succeeded in maintaining peace in Europe since the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, and it 
could serve the same purpose in the Mediterranean. These measures are introduced under the label of “partnership 
building measures”, whose major modality is the promotion of regular consultations and exchanges of information 
with its Mediterranean partners. The Arabs argue that these measures are not a substitute to the political settlement 
and they will not necessarily lead to security as long as major conflicts have not been resolved. They have worked in 
Europe because European territorial issues were resolved before they were introduced, and because East and West 
had reached arms control agreements that had achieved equilibrium in Europe. These conditions are lacking in the 
Mediterranean, and they have to be introduced before one can talk meaningfully about partnership building 
measures. The strategy of democratization of Mediterranean countries is another strategy pursued by the EU to 
achieve security in the Mediterranean. This includes promotion of democratic institutions, the rule of law, support 
for judicial reform, institution building and freedom of expression, and the strengthening of independent media and 
good governance. The assumption here is that democratization will lead to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Once 
again, Arab countries contend that democratization is not a substitute to conflict resolution. Democratization is a 
societal long-term process that ought to be introduced within the framework of the cultural norms of different 
Mediterranean countries. Conflict resolution and restoration of occupied territories cannot wait until democratization 
is complete. This is a recipe for providing Israel with ample time to colonize the entire occupied territories. Further, 
the EU conceptualizes its role in security arrangements in the region as one of: conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict rehabilitation. “It leaves the task of conflict resolution to the regional parties and the 
USA. The Arabs contend that conflict prevention is not a sufficient security strategy. Unless conflicts are resolved, 
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they could not be prevented from escalation in the future. Countries, which are at conflict, are not likely to agree on 
preventing further conflicts in the future (Selim, 2000a, 2000b).  
One the main areas in which there is a wide agreement on the security arrangement in the Mediterranean, is the 
notion of establishing a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle east zone free of mass destruction weapons, 
nuclear, chemical, and biological and their delivery systems and the ”signature and ratification by Mediterranean 
actors of all non-proliferation instruments such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), The Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention(CWC), and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). The agreement cannot be extended beyond this general policy statement, as the actors differ on the timing 
of the elimination of such weapons and the linkages between their elimination. The Europeans and the Israelis 
would prefer a focus on the biological and chemical weapons leaving the elimination of nuclear weapons until the 
completion of the Middle eat peace process. The Arabs argue that all weapons of mass destruction should be 
eliminated simultaneously and immediately.  
It is because of these disagreements that the EMP has not been able to introduce a generally accepted security 
paradigm, or to develop security structures other than the bilateral and multi-lateral dialogue institutions. This 
explains the inability of the Euro-Mediterranean partners to agree on the projected Charter for Peace and Stability, 
which was drafted by the EU. Arab countries raised serious reservations about adopting a security charter under 
conditions of Israeli occupation of Arab territories.  
The EU resorted to a new strategy to persuade its Arab partners in the Middle East to accept its security paradigm. 
It sent signals to these countries that it would revive the 5 + 5 formula for cooperation thereby marginalizing the 
concept of the EMP. The 5 + 5 formula was launched in 1989 as form of economic, and security cooperation 
between five north African Arab countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), and five south 
European Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta). The formula was suspended in 1992 
after Libya was charged of involvement in the downing of the Pan Am plane over Lockerbie. By signaling its 
willingness to revive this formula, which does not include a reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the EU hoped that 
other Arab countries will get in line and accept its version of the security component of the EMP. The EU made 
good on its signal. After ending the Lockerbie Question between Libya and the USA, France persuaded the member 
states of the 5+ 5 Formula to hold their first summit in Tunis. The summit was held on 56 December 2003. The final 
declaration of the summit reflected a tendency to focus on sub-regional Euro- Maghreb cooperation rather than a 
wider Euro-Mediterranean one (Selim, 2004).  
In February 2004, Germany presented a Middle East proposal titled “the Wider Middle East Initiative.” It became 
later a Franco-German proposal. The proposal was presented after the USA announced its “Greater Middle East 
Partnership” Initiative and more or less carried the same title. It will be analyzed in a later section when we refer to 
the American proposal.  
V Security Arrangements within the The Arab Regional Project 
The Arab Common Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty of 1950 put the foundations of an Arab collective 
security regime. It also established executive institutions such as the Arab Defense Council, and the Military 
Consultative Committee. In 1964, a General Unified Command for Arab Armies was established according to a 
resolution of the Arab summit held in Cairo in January 1964. These security mechanisms failed to establish an 
effective Arab collective security regime. This was because of inter-Arab rivalries over ideological orientations and 
regional leadership. The General Unified Arab Command also was not effective in dealing with the threat resulting 
from the Israeli attack in June 1967, and was dissolved later. The concept of Arab national security was dealt a 
major blow as a result of two major events, (I) the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in which. The treaty 
had effectively eliminated Egypt from any Arab regional security arrangement against Israeli. Article 10 of the 
treaty gave Egypt’s security commitments to Israel priority over its security commitments to Arab countries; and (ii) 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It shook the basics of this concept, which evolved around the notion that Israel 
was the main threat to the security of the Arab system. For the first time, some Arab countries found themselves in 
the same box with Israel in opposing the Iraqi invasion and working to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The 
crisis also shattered the Arab consensus that was emerging since 1987 on the re-invigoration of the Arab regional 
system.  
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After the end of the crisis of Iraqi invasion of 19901991, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Egypt 
and Syria signed “the Damascus Declaration,” on 6 March 1991. According to the Declaration the signing parties 
considered the presence of Egyptian and Syrian troops on the territories of some of the GCC countries as the 
beginning of forming an Arab peace force entrusted with the task of securing the GCC and a model to be pursued to 
re-invigorate the Arab common defense system. The Declaration also broadened the concept of security to include 
economic dimensions as it referred to the pledge of the participants to pursue economic policies that would achieve 
“balanced development” as a step toward establishing an Arab economic bloc. The Damascus Declaration was 
amended on 19 July 1991 to reflect the GCC states misgivings about the Arab collective security concept. The 
amendment changed the collective security concept laid down in March into an ad hoc and bilateral mechanism 
between each GCC State, Egypt and Syria, and gave each GCC states the right to request or reject such mechanism. 
Further, the economic component of the declaration was amended to delete reference to balanced development and 
restricting that component to coordination between the parties concerned. The Damascus Declaration itself was soon 
put in the history archives. 
The question of Arab regional security also witnessed disagreements on the conceptualization of Arab regional 
security between the Arab states in the Mashreq and the GCC states during a debate initiated in 1993 in the League 
of Arab States to re-formulate the concept of Arab regional security. Whereas the GCC countries expressed 
reservations over the concept an Arab regional security system and the Arab Mashrek countries presented measures 
to revitalize that system (Galal, 1997). The 1993 debate did not result in any specific conclusions concerning the 
revitalization of the Arab security arrangement, as the differences were quite deep. The Maghreb countries were 
almost oblivious to this debate paying more attention to their security commitments within the EMP or the 5 + 5 
Formula.  
Today, one can identify a high level of convergence of security conceptualizations among the Arab countries of 
the Mashreq (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority). These conceptualizations are heavily 
dominated by geo-political concerns and are characterized by an emphasis on the resolution of the territorial and 
existential issues in the Middle East before addressing the question of building security arrangements that would 
incorporate non-Arab powers (Selim, 2003). There is also an emphasis on revitalizing the League of Arab States as a 
forum for inter-Arab security debates. Further, Egyptian, Saudi, and Yemeni proposals have been submitted with a 
view of re-building the Arab collective security system. The Egyptian proposal submitted in July 2003 reiterated 
that the League should establish and Arab Security Council, an Arab court of justice, and an Arab parliament.  
The Arab summit held in Tunis in May 2004 adopted two documents. The first was on developing, modernizing, 
and reforming the Arab world. It enumerated a series of measures to be taken by each Arab country individually to 
introduce democratic changes. The second document was related to the reform of the structures and processes of the 
League of Arab States. For the first time, the Arabs were linking the regional institutional reform with domestic 
reform. However, no operational steps were taken to translate the two documents into realities. These documents 
were mainly adopted in response to the “Greater Middle East Project,” submitted by the USA, to which we will refer 
in a later section.  
VI The NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue 
At the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO held in Athens in June 1993, and in at 
the January 1994 Summit held in Brussels, NATO leaders expressed their conviction that security in Europe was 
highly influenced by the Mediterranean. NATO leaders thought that the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles 
had paved the way for measures to be taken by NATO to contribute to the reinforcement of peace and security in the 
Mediterraneanii. In December 1994, NATO leaders expressed their readiness to establish contacts on a case by case 
basis between the alliance and Mediterranean non-member states with a view to contributing to the strengthening of 
regional stability, and to achieve better mutual understanding. On 8 February 1995, NAC decided to initiate a direct 
dialogue with these states. The dialogue was initiated with five Mediterranean states outside NATO. These were 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, and Mauritania. The Dialogue was held in Brussels between the General-
Secretariat of NATO and the embassies of these countries. In December 1995, Jordan was incorporated in the 
Dialogue, and Algeria was participated in February 2000. The Dialogue was held in a bilateral and undeclared 
framework. Throughout the Dialogue sessions, specific proposals were discussed and it was agreed to hold the 
Dialogue twice a year on the basis of a specific agenda. The agenda included issues such as exchange of information, 
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visits of army officers, and that NATO would provide technical assistance in the area of civil management of 
emergency cases. In a seminar held in Rome in 1996, Balazino, the Deputy Secretary-General of NATO asserted 
that NATO would like to turn this dialogue into a public and collective one and that the objective of the Alliance 
was to “build a series of political relations which could provide each state with a sense of security.” Balazino argued 
that NATO would not take part in the processes of Mediterranean conflict resolution or arms control in the region. 
Nor would it provide economic assistance. These issues would be left to the EU. The Alliance would focus on issues 
related to exchange of information, and fighting terrorism and organized crime 
The participation of six Arab governments in the Dialogue is a strong indication that these governments perceive 
it in a positive framework. These governments view the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue as a mechanism to secure 
the continued interest of West in their security concerns. Although the Jordanian and Egyptian governments 
subscribe to this view, their perceptions of the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue have other dimensions. The 
Jordanians view the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue as a mechanism to boost their security in an environment ridden 
with multiple sources of threat. The Egyptians approach the Dialogue within the context of its impact on their 
regional role, and relationship with the Arab-Israeli peace process and inter-Arab relations. The Egyptian 
government contends that any NATO-Mediterranean security co-operation involving the Arabs and the Israelis must 
be preceded by a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. They are critical of NATO’s neglect of the pertinent 
territorial and economic concerns of southern Mediterranean countries, its emphasis on soft security issues, and 
exclusion of other Arab Mediterranean actors such as Libya and Syria.iii  
The NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue was widely criticized by the majority of Arab intellectuals. In Egypt, the 
NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue was criticized as (I) lacking a clear concept of Mediterranean security; and (ii) 
being selective by including some countries thereby leaving others actors such as Syria, Lebanon, and Libya (Saif, 
1998). An Egyptian analyst argued that the main objective of NATO was to “reach a specific agreement with some 
Arab countries which would secure the access of the Combined Joint Task Force to the military infrastructure of 
these countries...and to monitor the flow of missile technology to southern Mediterranean states which could 
threaten northern Mediterranean countries, and to monitor also the possession of some of the southern 
Mediterranean countries of WMD.” (Gad, 1998). However, some Arab analysts contended that NATO’s 
Mediterranean policy did not represent a threat to Arab security and it provided certain opportunities for future co-
operation between Arab countries and the European Union. Ahmad Nafeh, a leading former columnist argued that 
there were new forms of complementarity between NATO’s new agenda and Arab interests. For example, NATO’s 
new agenda focuses on combating terrorism and organized crimes. These issues were of the concern of NATO and 
Arab countries alike. According to Nafeh, this required a new Arab approach toward NATO. Such approach would 
focus on maximizing the areas of complementarity and minimizing the negative aspects of this policy, if they 
existed. General Mohammed Shiyyab of Jordan, among others argued that NATO could play a positive role in 
stabilizing north-south relations across the Mediterranean, bring expertise and credibility to bear in confidence 
building between the Arabs and the Israelis, and providing a link to a wider transatlantic security system spanning 
old regional boundaries thereby making an Israeli-Syrian peace more attractive (Shiyyab, 1996).  
In Israel, the perception of NATO’s role was different from the mainstream Arab perceptions. Israeli strategic 
thinkers were more supportive of NATO’s new role in the Mediterranean. Ambassador Hanan Bar On of the 
Weizman Institute contended that the transatlantic component of Mediterranean security must and should not be 
ignored. Mediterranean security cannot be realized without a NATO role. He went on to argue that Turkey being a 
NATO member and at the same time a member in the Mediterranean co-operation could serve as a link between 
both worlds.iv This was the view articulated as well by the Israeli government. Israel views its inclusion in the 
NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative with Arab countries as a symbol of its regional acceptance.  
NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue is more of a forum for the exchange of information than an arrangement for 
security in the Mediterranean. Most of the activities are related to holding seminars on issues related to security, and 
conducting limited military maneuvers.v  However, no security structures were established or envisioned. During the 
NATO summit in November 2000, various measures for cooperation in security matters were adopted. These 
measures include, military education, training and doctrine to address basic interoperability requirements, with a 
view to making Mediterranean countries better prepared to participate in military exercises and related training 
activities; military medicine, defense reform and defense economics including best practice in the economic and 
civilian management of defense forces; terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; border security, 
especially in connection with terrorism, the smuggling of small arms and light weapons and other illegal activities; 
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civil emergency planning including disaster management, science and environment including activities in the field 
of desertification, draught, management of water and other natural resources, and environmental pollution(Bin, 
2002). Because of the misgivings of the Mediterranean partners about NATO, and their perception of the Dialogue 
as a means to monitor their military activities, and because of the September 11, 2001 events, most of these 
measures remained as mere proposals until the completion of the invasion of Iraq in March-April 2003. NATO has 
moved to establish a new role for itself in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf region. This follows the role it has 
been performing in Afghanistan after the American occupation of that country. At present, NATO is considering 
playing a role in the Arabian Gulf. In fact, NATO has held two seminars in May 2004 in Doha and Rome to define 
that role. The new NATO projected role was debated in the summit of the G-8 held in the USA in June, 2004. 
Further, The June 2004 NATO summit has also decided that member states, individually, could help in training Iraqi 
security forces.  
VII Comparative Analysis of Middle Eastern Security Arrangements 
Security arrangements in the Middle East may be compared along four main dimensions, their underlying 
philosophical assumptions, their linkages with the mega trends identified in this paper, their institutional capacity 
and ability to contribute to peace in the region, and their relationships with the UN and big powers. In terms of the 
first dimension, the Arab project assumes that the main security problems of the region emanate from the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the unbalanced intervention of great powers into that conflict. The main sources of regional 
instability as viewed to be mainly external to the Arab system. Other projects have different assumptions. They are 
based on the premise that Middle Eastern troubles are the result of the lack of democracy and development in the 
Arab world. Such environment encourages extremism and “terrorism.” The main sources of instability are viewed to 
be inherent in the Arab system itself. Security will only be achieved if major domestic changes were introduced in 
Arab countries. As a result, the point of beginning in providing regional security is introducing domestic reforms 
into Arab countries and the Arab regional system. The Arab-Israeli conflict is not viewed as the main source of 
insatiability and lack of security in the region. As far as the second dimension is concerned, the EMP is the closest 
to the incorporation of the mega trends in a single framework. It is the only project that includes an emphasis on the 
adjustment of the Mediterranean countries to the pre-requisites of globalization, although it sometimes creates 
tougher rules than those mandated by globalization such as the case of the rules of origins stated in the EU’s 
association agreements with Arab states. The project emphasized upon trade liberalization, but only in the area of 
manufactured goods. Agricultural products will not be liberalized in the EMP as the EU would like to protect its 
farmers, but is somehow oblivious to the protection of nascent industries in Arab countries. The EMP has also 
created a neo-regional framework that secures the interests of the European countries in the Mediterranean and vice 
versa. However, Arab countries have criticized the EMP on grounds of failure to coordinate with the League of Arab 
States, and to include other Arab Mediterranean countries, such as Libya, and Mauritania. The EMP also included 
states, which are not legitimate members, such as Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey. Although these countries are 
Mediterranean powers, they are not interested in the EMP, and have not entered in any negotiations with the EU to 
sign association agreements, as their aspirations transcend the EMP. Finally, the EMP is the only project that 
emphasizes upon the notion of democratization as one of the main elements of the project. But the EU perceives the 
question of democratization from a European perspective. It views democratization as meaning compliance with the 
European norms and values. This is clearly stated in the Common European Strategy in the Mediterranean adopted 
by the EU in June 2000. In addition to the emphasis on the respect for human rights and the rule of law, the 
document refers to the change of family laws and abolition of the death penalty according to the European values.  
The notion of regionalism is the main thrust of the Arab regional project. This project hardly refers to the issue of 
coping with globalization or democratization. Perhaps the only exception is issuing the Declaration of the Rights of 
Citizens in Arab countries in 1971 and the Arab Charter for Human Rights in 1994 by the League of Arab States. 
The Charter reflected the awareness of the sponsors of the Arab regional project that the issue of democracy can no 
longer be ignored. However, the Charter remained a theoretical document lacking any mechanism for 
implementation or monitoring.  
Likewise, the Middle Eastern project is essentially an attempt at regional re-structuring with an emphasis on the 
economic and security dimensions. The main thrust of the project is directed towards economic regional 
Cooperation and building “soft” security arrangements.  
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The NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue almost lacks any significant connections with the three-mega trends. The 
substance of dialogue does not touch with any significant degree upon the issues of globalization or democratization. 
Neither is the Dialogue an attempt to create a new regional framework. Many analysts view the Dialogue as an 
attempt by NATO to monitor the region, rather than to change it.  
As far as the second dimension is concerned, the EMP and the League of Arab States have developed a set of 
regularized institutional arrangements through which the actors interact in the process of goal-attainment. The 
institutions of the League are older than those of the EMP. The institutions of the EMP are mainly subsidized and 
supervised by the European powers, which provide them with tremendous leverage over the policy making process. 
In fact, one may argue that the entire EMP is a European initiative in which the Mediterranean actors are in the 
position of the recipient of policies and guidelines. Conversely, a higher level of balance in cost distribution and the 
ability of the member states to make initiatives characterize the institutions of the League. Granted that the Arab 
Gulf states, Egypt and Syria are more influential in the League than other states, but they do not enjoy the position 
which the EU enjoys in the EMP.  
As mentioned earlier, the institutions of the Middle Eastern project are non-functional, and the NATO-
Mediterranean Dialogue is restricted to a set of ad hoc meetings.  
The four regional projects failed to establish credible collective security systems in the Middle East, or to provide 
solutions for the main conflicts that have been plaguing the region since the end the Second World War. The EU 
perceives the EMP as a mechanism for conflict prevention rather than conflict resolution. The League of Arab States 
was somehow more successful in the process of inter-Arab conflict resolution (Al-Atrash, 1999, Selim, 1983). Such 
success is far below what was expected when the League was established in 1945. The NATO-Mediterranean 
Dialogue is just a framework for consultation. Because the EMP is backed by the economic power of the EU, it was 
able to develop a set of economic cooperation arrangements through which funds flow from North to South with a 
view of upgrading Mediterranean economies in order to establish a free trade area by the year 2010. However, the 
EMP has failed to attract a large volume of foreign direct investment to the Mediterranean Partner countries or to 
increase the level of commerce between them and their European counterparts (Gillespie, 2002). The League of 
Arab States has initiated a similar project in 1998. Almost five years after the initiation of the Arab free trade area 
proposal, little was achieved in this respect. This is because of the competitiveness of Arab economies. They mostly 
export raw materials and import manufactured goods. 
Regarding the relationships between the Middle Eastern security arrangements and the UN and other external 
powers, the Arab regional system is the only project that explicitly recognizes the UN role. In fact, LAS is 
considered as a regional organization under the UN Charter. The Arab regional project is not linked with any of the 
big powers, although Britain played a role to facilitate the establishment of LAS during the Second World War. We 
have seen earlier that Western powers have attempted to replace LAS with a Middle Eastern arrangement. The 
Middle Eastern and Euro-Mediterranean projects and the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue were sponsored by the 
USA the EU, and NATO respectively. In fact, the survival of these projects largely depends on these powers. There 
is no clear link between these projects and the UN. One may argue that the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue is an 
attempt to play a security role in the Mediterranean, which the UN ought to play a security role in the Mediterranean, 
which the UN ought to play.  
VIII The Future of the Middle Eastern Security Arrangements 
The main conclusion to be drawn from our review of the Middle Easter security arrangements is that the region 
lacks a pan-regional security, Institution and that the present security arrangements do not provide a credible degree 
of security to the regional actors. The institutions of LAS are almost non-functional. They have played a limited role 
in the resolution of some disputes among member states, but did not provide a genuine security guarantee against 
external threats. Likewise, the institutions of the EMP and the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue are mainly 
frameworks for debating security issues. The fact that the projected Charter for Peace and Stability in the 
Mediterranean proposed by the EU has not been endorsed yet reveals the level of disagreement within the EMP on 
the conceptualization of security. Most Arab countries in the Middle East are still skeptical about the “real” 
objectives of NATO approaches to them. The Middle Eastern arrangements were frozen in 1997. There have been 
some suggestions to revive them in the wake of the occupation of Iraq in 2003. We will refer to these suggestions 
later. The September 11, 2001 events in the USA have dramatically changed the strategic environment in the Middle 
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East and the foundations of the present security arrangements. The USA claimed that the attacks emanated from the 
Middle East because of the “authoritarian character” of its Arab regimes. It claimed that the war against terrorism 
required social changes in the Middle East in the direction of full integration with globalization and forming new 
regional arrangements. In September 2002, the USA issued the National Security Strategy Paper (NSSP), which 
reiterated a new security doctrine for the USA. The NSSP envisaged the use of American resources to shape the 
political structures within states to promote democracy, and fight terrorism, the use of economic measures to 
liberalize international trade and to cut-off the financial supplies to terrorists and most importantly that the USA will 
use the doctrine of military preemption to foil threats to American. Security (Mazari, 2003).  
The Middle East was the arena of the implementation of the new American strategy, as the “terrorist” threats to 
the US was viewed as emanating from that region. The prelude to this process was the invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan in 2001. In March-April 2003, the Americans and the British invaded and occupied Iraq under the 
pretext of the possession of illegal of weapons of mass destruction. This is considered a prelude to the reshaping of 
domestic and regional arrangements in the Middle East. Further, the September 11 events strengthened the 
American-Israeli link more than ever before. In fact what emerged from September 11 is an American-Israeli 
strategic consensus on the perception of security threats and the way to deal with them in the Middle East. The main 
threats are viewed as emanating from terrorism, including the Palestinian movements of resistance to Israeli 
occupation. Both countries declared it was now legitimate to crush “the terrorists” by all means. The Bush 
Administration moved from a position of neglect to the Arab-Israeli conflict to a position of the full endorsement of 
the Shronian strategy of the physical elimination of the resistance movements. For the USA and Israel there is no 
difference between Al-Qaeda (the alleged sponsor of the September 11 attacks) and Hamas or Islamic Jihad 
movements in Palestine. In fact, Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State justified the American invasion of Iraq on 
grounds that it would enhance Israeli security by removing an adversary of Israel. 
Parallel with these developments, the Middle East has been witnessing vigorous attempts to revive the Middle 
Eastern project under American persuasion. There are five main indicators to corroborate our argument. Firstly, on 
17 March, 2003, and before boarding the Presidential plane to the Azores islands to consult with his partners on the 
date of invading Iraq, President Bush announced the long-waited “Road Map,” a document which envisaged a 
phased solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Road Map was drafted in mid 2002, but was only declared in the 
context of the final preparations for the invasion of Iraq as a means to win support of the Arab public opinion to the 
then-projected invasion. It referred to the revival of multi-lateral engagement on issues including regional water 
resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control issues during the second phase of the 
Map (June 2003-December 2003). This means a revival of the multi-lateral negotiations, which began after the 
Madrid Peace conference in 1991. These negotiations were designed to build Middle Easter cooperation regimes. 
Secondly, On 9 May 2003, President Bush suggested establishing a free trade area between Middle Eastern 
countries and the USA within ten years provided these countries had introduced economic and political reforms. The 
most important of these reforms are adhering to the World Trade Organization, protecting intellectual property 
rights, establishing democratic regimes, and fighting terrorism. The Bush proposal was not clear whether the 
projected free trade area will be an American-Middle Eastern area through which the USA will sign bilateral treaties 
with the regional actors, or a pan-Middle Eastern area that would create a Middle eastern free trade area as well. 
However, it seemed that the Bush proposal is an attempt to link the region with the three mega-trends in one process: 
establishing democratic regimes, promoting regional cooperation, and integration with the process of globalization.vi  
Thirdly, In October 2003, Colin Powell, the American Secretary of State, delivered a speech at the Arab-American 
Economic Forum held in Detroit. Powell outlined the elements of a new American vision in the Middle East based 
on three main elements, (i) the first is what Colin Powell called the Millennium Challenge Account,” according to 
which the USA will only provide assistance to countries of the Middle East which apply the rule of law. He added 
that the USA has earmarked US$10 billion to be increased by US$5 billion every two years, and that these funds 
will only be provided to countries which apply the rule of law, (Powell, 2003), (ii) the second element of the 
American strategy is free trade. He argued that “free trade has helped people to defeat poverty and learn the habit of 
freedom.” The USA will help Middle Eastern countries to introduce economic reforms, and enter the WTO. It will 
also sign bilateral trade agreements with these countries, (iii) The third element of the new American Middle Eastern 
strategy is the “Middle East Partnership Initiative.” (MEPI) according to which the USA will support those who 
work to expand the economic capabilities, increase public participation, and reform education. Powell added that 
“we are the ones who can bring about the desired change in the Arab world, because we are Americans who believe 
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in change, believe in the future, and we could help our Arab friends.” on November 2003, President Bush 
formalized the MEPI in his speech at the National Endowment for democracy. The MEPI entailed four “pillars.” In 
the economic pillar, the focus is on region-wide economic and employment growth driven by the private sector. In 
the political pillar, MEPI champions an expanded public space and participation and the rule of law. In the education 
pillar, there is a great deal of emphasis on enabling people to acquire knowledge and skills necessary to compete inn 
today’s economy. Finally, there is a women pillar which refers to grating women full and equal opportunities 
(http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/). The MEPI was later expanded into the “Greater Middle East Partnership”  to which we 
will refer. Fourthly, the USA has persuaded the Davos Forum, the sponsor the MENA conference in 1994, to hold 
an extra-ordinary meeting to draft a plan for Middle Eastern cooperation. The meeting was held in Jordan on 21-22 
June 2003. Various projects were submitted, the most important of which was the Jordanian-Israeli project to 
connect the Red Sea with the Dead Sea through a canal. In the conference, Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State 
announced that the Bush Administration asked the Congress to allocate US$500 million to support Middle Eastern 
projects. The Egyptians participated in the conference asserting, once again, that “any regional cooperation in the 
Middle East should be linked with the move towards a settlement and peace,”.vii  Fifth, In February 2004, the USA 
announced a new project tilted, The Greater Middle East Partnership.“(GME). The concept of a Greater Middle East 
was a new one. It referred to countries of the Arab world, plus Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, turkey, and Israel. The 
new American-sponsored project focused in introducing reforms in the “Greater” Middle in three main areas. These 
are promoting democracy and good governance, building knowledge society; and expanding economic opportunities. 
The first area referred to reforms in the fields of holding free elections, parliamentary training, independent media, 
anti0- corruption efforts, civil society. The area of knowledge society focused on basic education initiatives 
especially in the field of literacy, and education reform, and digital and business education initiatives. Finally, the 
area of expanding economic opportunities emphasized upon the centrality of finance fro growth initiatives, 
partnership for financial excellence, and trade initiatives. The GME suggested creating new institutions to 
implement these suggestions such as “the Greater Middle East Finance corporation, and” the Greater Middle East 
Development Bank. The GME Project envisioned a major role for the G-8 Group to assist in implementing the 
suggested reforms and creating these institutions (http://englsih.daralhayat.com/Spec/02-Article-20040213-
ac40bdaf-c0a8-0led-00). 
These developments indicate that the USA is striving to revive the Middle Eastern project at the expense of the 
competing ones. The ability of the US to implement these grand designs will depended on a number of factors, 
namely (I) to what extent the US will be able to solidify its power in Iraq. If the US is confronted with massive 
resistance, which seems to be likely, then US ability to implement its grand Middle Eastern design will be 
jeopardized; and (ii) to what extend will the US be able to provide a mutually acceptable solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. As mentioned earlier, the American position on the resolution of the conflict does not differ in any 
meaningful way from the Israeli one. In fact, the June 24, 2002 speech of President Bush on the Arab-Israeli conflict 
was so pro-Israel that some Israeli felt that the Sharon government could have written it themselves (Rafique, 2002). 
In April 2004, and in a joint press conference with the Prime Minister of Israel, the President Bush brought about a 
major change in American policy towards the conflict by declaring that the Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories are “facts” that cannot be changed, and the right of the return for Palestinian refugees is no longer valid. 
This had limited the US ability to present a balanced solution to the conflict. In fact, the Road Map, presented by 
President Bush and endorsed by the Quartet, is now a dead project. The failure to provide a solution to the conflict 
will impair any security arrangement in the future. One must recall that the collapse of the Middle east peace process 
in the Camp David Conference held in July 2000 had resulted in the stagnation of the EMP (Gillespie, 2002); and 
(iii) the ability of the sponsors of the competing regional projects to revive their regional commitments. The 
Secretary-General of LAS, Egypt and Saudi Arabia presented initiatives to re-invigorate LAS in the wake of the 
invasion of Iraq. Among the main proposals one may refer to the establishment of a pan Arab parliament, a 
mechanism for inter-Arab conflict resolution, the introduction of sanctions against countries which breach LAS 
Charter, and re-structuring the Arab Economic and Social Council, the institution that supervises Arab technical 
institutions. Some of these proposals were endorsed by the Arab summit held in Tunis in May, 2004. But their 
implementation is highly questionable. As far as the EMP is concerned, the 5 + 5 Formula has been already revived. 
Germany and France have presented the “Wider Middle East Initiative.” This Initiative is quite similar to the 
American GME Initiative in its emphasis on domestic reforms. But whereas the American project marginalizes the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as it does not give of the American proposal, the European one advocates parallel interest in 
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domestic reforms and the relation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Also, whereas the American proposal focuses on 
political and economic reforms, the European one contends that modernization of Middle Eastern countries should 
be given priority. However, the substance and the timing of the European Wider Middle East Project indicate that 
the Europeans are thinking along the American vision of the future of the Middle East, rather than the 
Mediterranean.  
XI The Internationalization of the Middle Eastern Security Arrangements 
The question of security arrangements in the Middle East has been internationalized more than ever before. The 
American Greater Middle East Project was quickly matched by a European supporting proposal. It was also 
endorsed by the G-8 summit held in the USA in June 2004. It seems that the region is now returning to the post First 
World War mandate system whereby the security structure is determined under the mandate system by big powers. 
The borders of the region are also being expanded beyond its traditional definition, and the major security issues are 
being viewed as mainly domestic rather than external. NATO is also moving to play a security role in the region.  
Perhaps, the most important manifestation of the international of security arrangements in the Middle East is the 
documents issued by the G0-8 summit held in the USA in June 2004. The summit issued three major documents 
which correspond more or less with the American GME project. It established a mechanism of communication 
between the G-8 countries and “Greater” Middle Eastern countries to ensure that the later are fulfilling the tasks 
outlined in the American project and holing them accountable for the lack of implementation. Further, the NATO 
summit held in Istanbul on June 28-30, 2004 has shifted its strategy towards inviting its Mediterranean Dialogue 
partners to consider a security role for NATO in the Mediterranean, with emphasis on combating “terrorism.” This 
represents a drastic shift from past policies which restricted NATO’s role to exchange of information.  
However, The Middle East is not likely to experience the formation of a genuine security regime in the near 
future, given the return of the region to the age of military occupation, and the asymmetry between the American 
militaristic approach to the achievement of its objectives in the region and its proposals to integrate the region into 
the process of globalization. The region is experiencing two contradictory processes: integration into globalization, 
and the quest for national liberation from occupation. The contradiction between these processes is likely to engulf 
the region into chaos. In fact, the region is already in a state of chaos because of the deteriorating situations in 
Palestine and Iraq. According to Fendi, an Arab-American analyst close to the neo-conservative group of 
Washington, “this chaos is likely to last for the next four years.” (Fendi, 2003). There is a great deal of resentment in 
the region towards the Greater or Wider Middle East projects. These projects are being viewed as attempts to 
dominate Arab countries and dilute the Arab-Islamic identity of its people, as was clearly stated by Ahmad Maher, 
the Foreign Minister of Egypt and major Arab analysts.viii  
X Policy Implications of the Experience of Middle Eastern Security Arrangements 
The Middle Eastern experience in the area of regional security arrangements provides ample lessons for the 
identification of conditions conducive to the effectiveness of these arrangements. The most important conclusion to 
be drawn from this experience is that security arrangements must address themselves to regional security concern of 
all regional actors, rather than the concerns of some of them or those of external powers. Projects sponsored by these 
powers usually address a security agenda detached from the local and regional one, which mostly lead to resentment 
on the part of the latter. This has been the experience of the Middle Eastern project. As was outlined earlier, this 
project was initiated in the early 1950s by Western powers to mobilize the region behind them in the Cold War 
rivalry with the Communist bloc. It was argued that the USSR was the main security threat to the region. Most Arab 
actors believed that the main threat came from the region itself. This led to a major confrontation through which the 
region became an arena for the Cold War rather than a domain for a regional security regime.  
Success of regional security arrangements also depends on the resolution of the main conflicts in the region, 
especially those related to territory and identity issues. Countries, which are at conflict, are not likely to enter into 
meaningful security arrangements. This is the main reason why security arrangements of the EMP have failed to 
bring about any results in the region. The EMP was based on the European concepts of conflict prevention rather 
than conflict resolution, and the introduction CBMs as a mechanism of conflict resolution. The European powers 
found out that they were unable to get a regional endorsement of the projected Charter for Peace and Stability in the 
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Mediterranean which is based on this approach, because the draft Charter ignored the present conflicts and focused 
on a futuristic agenda, and because they failed to realize that, as was in the European experience of the Helsinki 
Final Act in 1975, CBMs can only be effective within the framework of the overall process of territorial conflict 
resolution.  
The third main condition for the success of regional security arrangements is to establish them on the basis of 
strategic equilibrium. This concept entails two main dimensions, (i) the arrangements will achieve a balance 
between the actors whereby no actors feels threatened by the overwhelming power of other actors; and (ii) the actors 
will feel obtain more or less equal benefits from these arrangements. The EMP and Middle astern projects were 
based on an undeclared assumption of retaining and reinforcing Israel’s strategic superiority in the region. This was 
clear in the emphasis in both projects on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the region, excluding 
the nuclear weapons possessed by Israel. This meant that Israel would emerge as the only power in the region that 
possesses the nuclear category of weapons of mass destruction.  
Further, one of the reasons for the failure of the Arab regional project was the perception of some actors (The 
Gulf Cooperation Council States) that they are not likely to draw equal benefits from that project and that other 
states are using the project to draw upon their resources. Finally, in building security arrangements, one must take 
into consideration the local cultural variables. The Western-sponsored projects failed because they tended to project 
the Franco-German, or American-Japanese post Second World War cooperation as a model for Middle Eastern 
security architecture..  In fact, in his 5 April 2003 speech, President Bush referred to the peace achieved between the 
USA on one hand and Japan, Germany, Japan, and Russia on the other hand as a model for Middle Eastern peace. If 
one reviews the three models referred to by the American President cannot help but conclude that the three powers 
share one common dominator, that is, they were held with defeated powers, in the Second World War or the Cold 
War. One can hardly expect the success of a similar model in the Middle East where the culture is diametrically 
different from that of the three defeated powers referred to by George Bush. It is hardly possible to convince the 
Arabs to acknowledge defeat and make peace form that point. After all, one must remember that Sadat would have 
not been able to make peace with Israel without the partial victory he achieved in October 1973.  
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i Scholte conceptualized the relationship between globalization and democratization in a different way. He argued that whereas globalization 
has encouraged innovations in democratic practice, it has rendered old formulas of state-centric democracy inadequate and has undermined 
conventional liberal democracy. Globalization has brought tans border actors and flows, which cannot be put under the popular control of those 
affected, Scholte, 2000. 
ii Al-Ahram, (Cairo), 28 July 2003.The NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue was not the only security-oriented initiative suggested by Western 
powers. The West European Union (WEU), and the Organization for Security and /Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also suggested similar 
dialogues with Mediterranean countries. These dialogues did not last for long, and were discontinued as it became clear there were repetitions of 
the NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue and EU’s project. 
iii Despite these criticisms, Egypt and Algeria participated in the multi-lateral military maneuvers led by NATO within the framework of the 
NATO-Mediterranean Project in September 3003, Al-Ahram, 4 September 2003. 
iv Statement in Thomas Scheben, ed., Security Structures in the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the Near East, Cairo: Conrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, 1998, p.82. 
v Alberto Bin, a NATO official, argued that “information is the key component of the initiative facilitating mutual understanding between the 
Alliance and Dialogue countries”, Bin, 1999. 
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vi There has been some disagreement among Arab analysts on the objectives of the projected American-Middle Eastern free trade area. Some 
of them viewed it as an attempt to control Arab markets and enable Israel to dominate the region, Lari, 2003. They argued that the Bush proposal 
links any regional cooperation to the integration of Israel into that process. They recalled that the USA-Jordan free trade area of 2001 required 
Jordanian exports to the American market to have an Israeli component in order to qualify for a free trade status in the American market, and 
argued that the same rule will apply to the projected free trade area with other Middle e/astern countries. Others contended that the Bush proposal 
is a genuine attempt to introduce reforms into the region through the reward of trade liberalization, Abdel-Jawad, 2003. 
vii Akhbar El-Yom (Cairo), 21 June 2003. 
viii For example, Mounir Ne’ma (2004) viewed the Greater Middle East Project as a new Sykes-Picot arrangement. He was referring to the 
Anglo-American secret deal to partition the Arab East after the end of the First World War. Another analyst, Zakaria Neal (2004) also argued that 
the Project is an attempt to dissolve the League of Arab States and replace it with another Middle Eastern arrangement. 
